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THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN U.S. ANTITRUST LAW 
 
GEORGE A HAY* 
 
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
 
 In this paper, I report on a series of recent decisions in antitrust cases by the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  While each decision, read separately, may be only of moderate 
interest (even to a U.S. audience), the slate of decisions, looked at in its entirety, 
conveys a significant message, and one that may have meaning for scholars and 
practitioners in Australia and other jurisdictions outside the U.S.  I would suggest 
that a quiet revolution is occurring in which the arguments economists have been 
making for nearly fifty years have suddenly been embraced by both the left and the 
right on the Court.  The revolution is not yet complete; there is still substantial 
tidying up to do. But it will not take long before the entire corpus of antitrust has 
been transformed to fit the consumer welfare model with the added feature that it has 
been tailored to a world in which general purpose federal judges and lay juries 
(unless put on a very tight leash) can make mistakes which not merely can result in 
an injustice in the particular matter under litigation, but also can have significant 
dampening effects on the willingness of large, efficient firms to use their efficiency 
to compete vigorously.  The fact that the law is catching up to a body of defendant-
friendly economic theory that is fifty years old at about the same time that economic 
theory has begun to move in a direction that is more plaintiff-friendly is an ironic 
footnote to the story. 
 The plan of the paper is, first, merely to summarize the decisions and the 
attendant issues sequentially, and then, second, to evaluate them as a package.  The 
third part of the paper speculates on further developments.  The final section 
considers the possible implications for Australia. 
 
II   A CATALOGUE OF RECENT DECISIONS1 
 
A   Setting the Scene 
 
 The flurry of recent decisions began in 2004 with Trinko2 and Empagran.3 
However, for completeness, we should refer to two earlier decisions that started us 
down the path.  In 1993, the Supreme Court decided Brooke Group,4 a case which 
                                                 
*  By George A Hay. The Edward Cornell Professor of Law and Professor of Economics, 
Cornell University. This paper was prepared for the 2007 Australian National University 
Law and Economics Conference. The author is grateful to Erik Schmid for assistance in 
preparation of this article. 
 
1  Not surprisingly, I am not the only person to comment on this recent collection of 
decisions. Others include, J Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Federal Trade 
Commissioner, ‘A New Direction for Antitrust at the Supreme Court?’ (Speech delivered 
at the Minnesota State Bar Antitrust Section Meeting, 1 March 2007), available at 
<http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/070301minnspeech.pdf> at 18 July 2007; Darren S 
Tucker and Kathleen N Pessolano, Supreme Court’s Weyerhaeuser Decision Follows 
Recent Pattern (2007) Antitrust Source <http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-
source/07/04/Apr07-TuckPess4=27f.pdf> at 18 July 2007. 
2  Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, LLP, 540 US 398 (2004). 
3  F Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v Empagran SA, 542 US 155 (2004). 
4  Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209 (1993). 
                         The University of Queensland Law Journal                      2007 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
articulated the modern two-part test for establishing unlawful predatory pricing: a) 
pricing below some measure of cost, and b) a significant likelihood of recouping any 
profit sacrifice that occurred during the period of the alleged predation.  It is clearly 
recognized today and was acknowledged by the Court at the time that this test sets a 
high hurdle for plaintiffs.  However, an important theme of the Court’s decision was 
that trial court judges and juries make mistakes, and that mistakes of the Type I or 
false positive variety5 in a predatory pricing case run a significant risk of deterring 
perfectly legitimate, pro-competitive and pro-consumer price cutting.  Hence the 
high hurdle represented a conscious effort to minimize the incidence of Type I errors 
by allowing a plaintiff to succeed only when there was almost no chance that the 
defendant’s conduct was competitively benign.  The following passage (one of 
several echoing the same theme) is worth quoting: 
 
As a general rule, the exclusionary effect of prices above a relevant 
measure of cost either reflects the lower cost structure of the alleged 
predator, and so represents competition on the merits, or is beyond the 
practical ability of a judicial tribunal to control without courting intolerable 
risks of chilling legitimate price cutting.6 
 
 The second older decision was Khan,7  overturning the per se rule against 
vertical maximum price fixing. (When the Court declares something illegal per se, 
the plaintiff is spared the burden of proving an anticompetitive effect; such an effect 
is presumed as a matter of law. Horizontal price fixing is illegal per se. Until this 
decision, so was vertical price fixing.)  From an economics point of view, the result 
was a no-brainer; as far as I know, no respectable economist has supported the per se 
rule for maximum price fixing since the date it was established. 8  What was 
significant was that the Supreme Court was willing to acknowledge that its prior rule 
was flatly inconsistent with sound economics and that, despite respect for the 
traditional doctrine of stare decisis, sound economics (at least when there is an 
overwhelming consensus) must trump the respect usually accorded precedent.  
 
B   Trinko 
 
 The first of the recent batch of cases was Trinko.9 On the facts, this was a silly 
case.  It involved a scenario that will resonate with an Australian audience, viz., a 
fight about whether the owner of the local exchange telephony structure has an 
obligation to make parts of its network available to new entrants or smaller 
competitors.  But the plaintiff was not the disappointed would-be competitor but a 
class action consisting essentially of telephone consumers claiming they could have 
enjoyed less expensive telephone service had the incumbent been more cooperative.  
The would-be competitor, in the meanwhile, had successfully complained to the 
Federal Communications Commission under a federal statute specifically governing 
                                                 
5  A Type I Error (‘false positive’) would be finding a defendant liable for predation when 
there was no real risk of successful monopolization or harm to competition. 
6  Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209, 223 (1993). 
7  State Oil Co v Khan, 522 US 3 (1997). 
8  The rule, as applied to vertical maximum price fixing, came out of Albrecht v Herald Co, 
390 US 145 (1968). 
9  I wrote about Trinko when it first appeared. See George A Hay, ‘Trinko: Going All the 
Way’ (2005) 50 Antitrust Bulletin 527. 
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the right of access and the terms on which access should be granted.10  So, from a 
‘logical’ perspective, one could have imagined the case being thrown out because a 
regulatory agency, not the federal courts, really had jurisdiction; because this was 
not the proper complainant; and because the would-be competitor eventually got 
what it wanted under the access statute.  For reasons too complicated to explain here, 
the Supreme Court decided that this plaintiff was entitled to seek compensation 
under the antitrust laws, so long as the plaintiff could establish liability.  But the 
Court then decided (taking into account the telephony-specific legislation as part of 
the background) that the plaintiff had not established liability.  This could have been 
done in a few short sentences that focused on the narrow facts and special 
circumstances of the case.  Instead, the Court, in a unanimous decision with an 
opinion by Justice Scalia,11 let loose with a few broad swipes against the notion that 
a monopolist had some special duty to deal with a would-be competitor.  The Court, 
without overruling it, essentially buried the earlier Aspen Skiing decision12 normally 
relied on in such refusal-to-deal cases, describing it as ‘at or near the outer boundary 
of §2 liability.’13  The opinion also effectively disowned the so-called ‘essential 
facilities’ doctrine, another frequent vehicle for plaintiffs in refusal cases, saying 
simply: ‘[w]e have never recognized such a doctrine …’14 The opinion suggested 
(without saying so explicitly) there could never be liability under §2 when the 
defendant has never sold the intermediate product or service at arm’s length,15 and 
that, in the absence of a specific regulatory requirement to the contrary, an 
incumbent is not required to sell at less than the short-run profit-maximizing price.16 
Finally, as in Brooke Group, the opinion raised the spectre of false positives 
counselling that ‘[m]istaken inferences and the resulting false condemnations “are 
especially costly because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed 
to protect.”’17 As I have argued elsewhere,18 the opinion could be read as signalling 
the end of a monopolist’s duty to deal except where a specific regulatory statute 
suggests otherwise.19 The decision was unanimous although the three Justices who 
concurred would have decided the case on much simpler grounds. Note: the 
Department of Justice filed an amicus curiae brief siding with the defendant. 
  
                                                 
10  This would be somewhat similar to Part IIIA or Part XIB of the Australian Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) except that there was an industry-specific regulatory agency 
charged with enforcing the statute and ensuring access on reasonable terms. 
11  Three Justices concurred in the result but would have resolved the matter simply on 
grounds that the plaintiff lacked standing. Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of 
Curtis V Trinko, LLP, 540 US 398, 416 (2004). 
12  Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp, 472 US 585 (1985). 
13  Trinko, 540 US 398, 409. 
14  Ibid 411 (citing Aspen, 472 US 585, 611, n 44). 
15  Trinko, 540 US 398, 409-410.  
16  Ibid 409. 
17  Ibid 400 (quoting Matsushita Elec Indus Co, Ltd v Zenith Radio Corp, 475 US 574, 594 
(1986)). 
18  Hay, above n 9. 
19  Despite the unquestioned wisdom of my analysis, plaintiffs have had some success in 
lower courts since Trinko. See Edward D Cavanagh, ‘Trinko: A Kinder, Gentler 
Approach to Dominant Firms Under the Antitrust Laws?’ (2007) 59 Maine Law Review 
111. Apparently, incumbents have not yet figured out that a blanket refusal is a lot more 
risky than simply picking a price that renders it a matter of indifference whether the 
applicant gains access or not. 
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C   Empagran 
 
 On its face, Empagran20 did not involve a substantive issue, but merely one of 
standing and statutory interpretation.21 The Court, again in a unanimous decision,22 
held that a foreign plaintiff did not have standing to bring a case in the U.S., under 
U.S. antitrust law, for harm caused by conduct (specifically, a price-fixing cartel) 
which occurred entirely overseas (so long as the adverse effect on foreign plaintiffs 
was wholly independent of any adverse effect on U.S. consumers).  The opinion, 
viewed in isolation, would not cause anyone to suspect that it might be part of some 
broad reform program.  Nevertheless, it is worth noting three things about the case: 
unanimous decision, pro-defendant outcome, and with an amicus brief by the 
Department of Justice, siding with the defendant’s position. 
 
D   Volvo 
 
 The Volvo 23  case involved the interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act 
which, generally speaking, prohibits price discrimination which adversely affects 
competition.  Once a significant statute, it now is of such little independent 
consequence that many law school courses in antitrust law never get around to 
teaching it.24  The decision, too narrow to justify detailed explanations, made it 
incrementally harder for a plaintiff to succeed. Again, viewed in isolation, the case 
would not be of any great significance. But note three things about the case: near 
unanimous decision, 25  defendant victory, with an amicus brief filed by the 
Department of Justice siding with the defendant. 
 
E   Dagher 
 
 Another case that, in isolation, would not be remarkable, Dagher26 involved a 
rather silly application of the per se rule to the setting of price by an admittedly 
lawful joint venture for two of the brands that it marketed.  Oversimplifying slightly, 
Texaco and Shell formed a joint venture, approved by the FTC, which combined the 
downstream operations (refining and distribution of gasoline and other petroleum 
products) of the two companies.  All control over the marketing of the products was 
delegated to the operator of the joint venture corporation.  As part of the creation of 
                                                 
20  F Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v Empagran SA, 542 US 155 (2004). 
21  The statute that had to be interpreted was not the Sherman Act but the Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982. 
22  One Justice did not participate. 
23  Volvo Trucks North America, Inc v Reeder-Simco GMC, 546 US 164 (2006). 
24  Sometimes, claims of price discrimination are aimed at dominant firms and are combined 
with claims of predatory pricing; this was true of Brooke Group. But, in such cases, the 
Court has told us to apply traditional Sherman Act principles. The infrequency of 
successful claims against non-dominant firms for injuries caused by non-predatory price 
discrimination have rendered the Act of very little independent significance, and there 
are frequent calls for its repeal, although such calls are forcefully resisted by the small 
business community which usually resolves in a stalemate. 
25  Justice Stevens, with Justice Thomas concurring, dissented. However, it is significant 
that Justice Stevens made it clear that he thought that the statute served no useful 
purpose; nevertheless, he dissented because he thought the language of the statute clearly 
applied to the alleged conduct.  
26  Texaco Inc v Dagher, 547 US 1 (2006). 
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the joint venture, Texaco and Shell agreed that, once the joint venture was up and 
running, the joint venture operator would be required to sell the Texaco brand at the 
same price (whatever it was) that it sold the Shell brand.  Somehow, the court of 
appeals found a way to characterize this as horizontal price fixing among 
competitors, therefore calling for the non-discretionary application of the per se rule.  
The Supreme Court pointed out the obvious, viz., that once the joint venture took 
over responsibility for the marketing (including the pricing) of the two brands, they 
could not really be said to be in competition with one another. 27  Hence the 
agreement between Shell and Texaco did not eliminate any competition that would 
otherwise have occurred.  So this was an easy case and, in isolation, not especially 
newsworthy.  But note three things: unanimous decision, pro-defendant outcome, 
and amicus brief by the Department of Justice on the side of the defendant. 
 
F   Illinois Tool 
 
 Illinois Tool28 involved a simple point of law, viz., whether, in a tying case, a 
patent necessarily confers market power on the patent holder.29 Everyone knows 
there are lots of worthless patents, but there was nevertheless enough case law to 
support an appellate court decision that market power could be presumed from the 
existence of a patent.  The Supreme Court said that such a presumption was not 
warranted and that the plaintiff had the burden to prove market power in the 
traditional way.  Again, in isolation, there is nothing remarkable about this. But note 
three things: unanimous decision,30 pro-defendant outcome, and amicus brief by the 
Department of Justice in favour of the defendant’s position. 
 
G   Weyerhaeuser 
 
 Weyerhaeuser31 was the first of the four decisions to come from the Court thus 
far in 2007.  It is a full-fledged opinion on a substantive issue of antitrust law, 
although it involves conduct which has rarely been discussed heretofore in the case 
law or the literature (and may be quite rare in practice), viz., predatory buying or 
predatory bidding.32  Predatory buying is on the buying side what predatory pricing 
is on the selling side.  A buyer of inputs buys more inputs than it would if it were 
maximising short-term profits and, if the supply curve slopes upward, will wind up 
paying a higher price for those inputs as a consequence.33 The object of the exercise 
                                                 
27  Thus, for example, had it been the manager of the joint venture, not Shell and Texaco, 
that made the decision to price the two brands equally, no one would have even 
considered the possibility that this might violate §1 of the Sherman Act. 
28  Illinois Tool Works Inc v Independent Ink, Inc, 547 US 28 (2006). 
29  This is significant because, if the defendant possesses market power in the tying product, 
then a tying arrangement involving two separate products will be unlawful per se so long 
as a non-trivial amount of dollar commerce in the tied product is foreclosed to 
competitors by the tie. 
30  One Justice did not participate. 
31  Weyerhaeuser Co v Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co, Inc, 127 S Ct 1069 (2007). 
32  The economics of predatory buying and the decision in Weyerhaeuser are discussed in a 
forthcoming article. See George A Hay, Rhonda L Smith and Alexandra Merrett, 
‘Predatory Bidding: The Weyerhaeuser Decision and its Implications for Australia’ 
(forthcoming) Competition and Consumer Law Journal. 
33  It can also be characterised in such a way as to reverse the causation: A buyer offers to 
pay more than it needs to in order to acquire the amount of input it requires for short-run 
profit maximisation, and suppliers will therefore seek to sell more than they would at 
lower prices. It does not really matter which way the causation is expressed, since the 
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is to drive competing purchasers of inputs from the market and ultimately wind up as 
the sole buyer.  When that time comes (if it comes) the predator expects to be able to 
buy inputs at a monopsonistically low price. 
 It is clear that, while monopoly power and monopsony power are completely 
symmetric from a technical economic viewpoint, courts and commentators have 
always struggled with the concept of monopsony power.  The most common 
misconception is that monopsony power, by allowing the monopsonistic buyer to 
acquire inputs at a lower price, will actually be good for the consumer since some or 
all of the lower input costs will be passed on to the consumer of the final product.  
This is wrong because the mechanism by which monopsonistic buyers push down 
the purchase price of the input is by buying a smaller quantity of inputs.  Therefore, 
in the downstream market, the monopsonist’s production will actually decrease, not 
increase, and thus cannot make consumers better off.34 Not surprisingly, the few 
efforts to deal with predatory buying have fared no better.  In Weyerhaeuser, the 
appellate court, in a thoroughly garbled opinion, tried to distinguish predatory 
pricing and predatory buying and concluded that, while unsuccessful attempts to 
acquire a monopoly through predatory pricing could be good for consumers, 
unsuccessful attempts to acquire a monopsony through predatory buying would not 
provide any consumer benefit.  Therefore, the appellate court rejected defendant’s 
claim that the Brooke Group tests for alleged predatory pricing35 should be adapted 
and applied symmetrically to alleged predatory buying.  The Supreme Court did not 
get it quite right either, but on balance, came closer.36  The Court stressed the 
symmetry of predatory pricing and predatory buying, repeated the rationale for a 
conservative approach to predatory pricing (successful attempts to engage in 
predatory pricing are rare; failed attempts are good for consumers; Type I errors in 
prosecution will deter socially desirable aggressive price competition) and 
determined that the same conservative approach should apply to alleged predatory 
buying.   
 My own take on Weyerhaeuser, independent of any minor quibbles with the 
Court’s technical analysis, is that if you think Brooke Group is the right approach to 
alleged predatory pricing (which I do, at least in the U.S. context), then it is hard to 
see why a symmetric approach should not be used in connection with alleged 
predatory buying.  Of course, whether as a matter of statutory interpretation 
Australia can import Brooke Group, or whether as a matter of policy it should, is a 
more complex question.37 But for now, let me observe the following: unanimous 
decision, pro-defendant outcome, and an amicus brief by the Department of Justice 
essentially taking the defendant’s position.  Note also the emphasis on the possibility 
and cost of Type I errors as justifying a conservative enforcement approach. 
 
                                                                                                                
higher prices paid and the greater quantities purchased are two-sides of the same 
predatory coin. 
34  Whether consumers will actually be worse off depends on the structure of the 
downstream market. If that market is competitive, then the equilibrium price will be 
essentially unchanged even as the monopsonist produces less. See Hay, Smith and 
Merrett, above n 32. 
35  See above n 4 and accompanying text. 
36  See Hay, Smith and Merrett, above n 32. The main argument we have with the Court’s 
analysis is that it seemed to discount any benefits to sellers of inputs from unsuccessful 
attempts to engage in predatory buying, and overstated the likely benefits to consumers. 
37  Discussed in ibid. 
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H   Twombly 
 
 The very fact that the Court took this case38 suggests that there is an agenda to 
tidy up antitrust law.  The case involved an alleged conspiracy among incumbent 
local telephone exchange owners to refuse to share their facilities with smaller 
competitors or new entrants.  If this sounds generally familiar, it is not surprising.  
When the Supreme Court threw out the Trinko claim, stating that an incumbent has 
no general duty to deal, some clever lawyers transformed it from a §2 monopoly 
case to a §1 agreement case by alleging that the incumbents in all the various local 
areas had agreed with one another that each would resist the applications for sharing 
in their respective areas, and that each would refrain from entering adjacent 
territories where their neighbours were the incumbent monopoly.39 Before knowing 
any more facts, one would naturally be suspicious of the first part of the claim, given 
that each had an independent reason not to want to share its facilities with potential 
competitors.  Hence, while one might expect to observe defendants acting in parallel 
(each refusing to share), this could be the result of independent decision-making by 
each incumbent. With respect to the second part of the claim, there are at least three 
potential explanations for the failure to enter adjacent territories: a) given the 
incumbent’s refusal to share on reasonable terms, it would simply not have been 
profitable; b) it would have been profitable in the ‘short-run,’ but would invite 
incumbents to retaliate, and hence the rational strategy would be to engage in 
oligopolistic interdependence and hold one’s fire in the hope that the other 
incumbents would do likewise; c) the incumbents agreed to stay out of each others’ 
territories.  
 In any event, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging a conspiracy.  They said little 
to support the first allegation and, with respect to the second, cited an executive’s 
statement which, charitably read, could support either the oligopolistic 
interdependence explanation or the conspiracy explanation.  Defendants moved to 
dismiss the case based on ‘failure to state a claim,’ and the trial judge granted the 
motion saying, in effect, ‘I don’t believe your story; it is simply not plausible given 
what I know about the context.’40 The court of appeals reversed, saying, in effect: 
‘this has nothing to do with the merits.  The plaintiff alleged a conspiracy; the i’s 
were dotted and the t’s crossed, and all the words were spelled correctly.  That 
should be enough to survive a motion to dismiss.  We’ll get to the merits later, and 
defendants can move for summary judgment at the appropriate time (which would 
be following at least some discovery).’41  
 The standard for drafting a complaint that can survive a motion to dismiss is 
normally not the kind of stuff that makes it to the Supreme Court.  But defendants 
(and defendants’ bar) made the following, not unreasonable, plea: ‘this just isn’t fair. 
If this motion is denied we will be subject to millions of dollars of costs in 
complying with discovery demands.  This shouldn’t be allowed to happen just 
because the plaintiff utters the word “agreement” in association with parallel 
conduct.  So, regardless of the relaxed standards usually applied to the filing of a 
                                                 
38  Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 127 S Ct 1955 (2007). 
39  In the U.S., the original AT&T monopoly was broken up along regional lines twenty 
years ago. Hence, unlike the situation in Australia where Telstra is dominant everywhere, 
there is a different incumbent ‘monopolist’ in each region of the U.S., although, as a 
result of various mergers, there are now in total only 3 or 4 independent incumbents. 
40  See Twombly v Bell Atlantic Corp, 313 F Supp 2d 174, 188-9 (SDNY, 2003). 
41  See Twombly v Bell Atlantic Corp, 425 F 3d 99, 118-19 (2nd Cir, 2005). This is obviously 
a very loose paraphrasing of the court’s analysis but I think it captures the flavour of the 
basic rationale for the decision. 
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complaint, the Court needs to do something to save us from these plaintiffs’ lawyers 
who simply want to coerce settlements and have no interest in the underlying merits 
of the case.’42 So the Court accepted the case, thereby turning what looked to be a 
minor issue of procedure into a more substantive inquiry into the legal and economic 
analysis of conspiracy. 
 Not surprisingly, the Court, by a 7-2 margin, reversed the court of appeals and 
dismissed the complaint.  There was no dispute between the majority and the dissent 
about the substance of antitrust law – mere parallel conduct is not enough to support 
a conspiracy claim, either because parallel conduct can be independent (and a 
competitive response to common cost drivers) or because parallel conduct can be the 
result of oligopolistic interdependence without the need for any prior agreement.  
But the majority wanted to protect defendants against the costs associated with 
defending (ultimately) meritless complaints that would be incurred in-between the 
filing of a complaint and the appropriate time for a motion for summary judgment 
(after at least some discovery had occurred).  The Court even invoked the ‘problem 
of false positives.’43 
 Is this decision a surprise? Probably not.  Will it have any effect on substantive 
antitrust doctrine? Probably not.  Will it weed out large numbers of spurious 
complaints? Too early to tell.  But, in placing this opinion in context, again notice 
the presence of the three recurring factors: decision for defendants, nearly 
unanimous (and certainly unanimous with respect to substantive antitrust doctrine), 
with amicus participation by the Department of Justice on the side of the defendants. 
 
I   Credit Suisse 
 
 This case44 does not involve any substantive issues of antitrust but simply the 
issue of when plaintiffs can sue under the antitrust laws for conduct that is very 
clearly regulated by another body, in this case the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission. The Court, in a 7-1 decision, ruled that, in this particular case, the 
application of antitrust law was in conflict with the regulatory scheme and therefore 
that the application was pre-empted. The one reason for mentioning the case at all 
was that the Court used some of the language referred to above to the effect that 
nonexpert judges and nonexpert juries can frequently make mistakes that result not 
only in the inconsistent application of antitrust law but also in underwriters (the 
would-be defendants) acting ‘in ways that will avoid not simply conduct that the 
securities law forbids (and will likely continue to forbid), but also a wide range of 
joint conduct that the securities law permits or encourages (but which they fear could 
lead to an antitrust lawsuit and the risk of treble damages).’ 45   Again, a near 
unanimous decision, favouring defendants.46 
 
                                                 
42  See Appellees’ Br. At 29-30. Similarly, this is a paraphrase of the defendants’ argument 
designed to provide a flavour of the policy arguments that underlay the legal analysis. 
43  The dissent merely observed, although forcefully, that there was legislative support and a 
long-established judicial tradition of not requiring anything more than a simple statement 
of the claim in the complaint itself and expressed substantially more optimism about the 
ability of the trial judge to control discovery costs. See Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 
127 S Ct 1955 (2007).  
44  Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v Billing, 127 S Ct 2383 (2007). 
45  Ibid 2396. 
46  In this case, the Justice Department submitted an amicus brief that tried to balance the 
interests of antitrust enforcement and securities regulation. 
Vol 26 (1)                     The Quiet Revolution in U.S Antitrust Law 
 
 
 
35 
 
J   Leegin 
 
 Leegin47 is one of those antitrust cases where, at least at the appellate level, the 
detailed facts really do not matter.  The defendant, a manufacturer of women’s 
accessories such as handbags, instituted a ‘Retail Pricing and Promotion Policy,’ 
under which it would sell its products to only those retailers that followed its 
suggested resale prices.  Arguably, under the Colgate doctrine48 as re-vivified in 
Monsanto,49 that is lawful so long as it represents a unilateral statement of policy and 
pattern of enforcement by the manufacturer.  Subsequently, however, the defendant 
took action that even a C-student of antitrust law would warn against – it insisted 
that its retailers pledge to comply with the pricing policy in order to become an 
authorised retail outlet.  It should hardly have come as a shock when one of the 
retailers that were suspended by the manufacturer filed suit claiming that it was 
suspended because it would not comply with an unlawful resale price maintenance 
(rpm) agreement.   
 The defendant argued in court that its conduct should not be treated under the 
per se rule and offered testimony by a highly-regarded (conservative) economist to 
the effect that Leegin’s policy (which it referred to euphemistically as ‘Suggested 
Retail Prices’) was pro-competitive.  The trial judge excluded the testimony as 
irrelevant given the per se rule, which the court refused to abandon, feeling itself 
bound by the unambiguous prior statements of the Supreme Court.  So the case went 
to the Court on the purely legal issue (albeit imbued with economic analysis) of 
whether rpm should continue to be per se illegal.   
 The per se rule is supposed to be reserved for conduct which is so frequently 
anticompetitive (and so rarely pro-competitive) that blanket condemnation is 
justified on grounds of administrative convenience.  Whatever the views of 
individual economists on whether rpm can be anticompetitive under certain 
conditions, 50  few would support the proposition that it is almost always 
anticompetitive.  Hence, for most economists, the argument that, like vertical non-
price restraints, rpm should be evaluated under the rule of reason is not a difficult 
one.51 Economists, of course, are less concerned with stare decisis.  
                                                 
47  Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, dba Kay’s Closet … Kay’s Shoes, 
127 S Ct 2705 (2007). 
48  United States v Colgate & Co, 250 US 300 (1919). 
49  Monsanto v Spray-Rite Service Corp, 465 US 752 (1984). 
50  The most extreme position would be that, unless it is imposed on an unwilling 
manufacturer by colluding retail dealers, rpm is pro-competitive or, at worst, neutral. A 
more common position would be that, absent significant market power on the part of the 
manufacturer, a unilateral decision by the manufacturer to impose rpm on its retailers 
cannot significantly harm competition. 
51  The first step in the rule of reason analysis would be an evaluation of the manufacturer’s 
market power. Absent significant market power, the presumption would be that rpm does 
not adversely affect competition to any degree worth worrying about. A small 
community of rpm die-hards would oppose a full scale rule of reason approach 
(especially one with a market power screen), but few would maintain that rpm should 
always be unlawful. Those who oppose a full scale rule of reason approach typically 
propose some kind of rebuttable presumption of illegality. See, for example, Pamela 
Jones Harbour, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commissioner, An Open Letter to the 
Supreme Court of the United States from Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour, 26 
February 2007 (2007) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/harbour/070226verticalminimumpricefixing.pdf> at 18 
July 2007. See especially pages 18-20. 
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 The Court explicitly aligned itself with what it perceived to be the prevailing 
(by a wide margin) view among economists and indicated that, while stare decisis is 
generally to be respected, it cannot be sustained in the face of such overwhelming 
economic authority.  Hence, rpm, like other vertical restraints, will henceforth be 
evaluated under the rule of reason.  Hence, another victory for defendants, and 
another amicus brief by the Department of Justice in favour of defendant’s position. 
The one difference is that this case was decided not by a unanimous or even near-
unanimous opinion but by a 5-4 majority.  Had it been the only antitrust case 
decided this term, the narrow majority would have allowed those writing in or about 
other jurisdictions to discount its significance.  But in the face of all that preceded 
Leegin, the message is clear: this Supreme Court wants to re-make antitrust law to 
bring it into accord with (what it perceives to be) accepted economic doctrine.  
 
 
III   EVALUATION 
 
 With the possible exception of Leegin, which overturned a century old 
precedent, not one of these decisions, looked at in isolation, is revolutionary.  But 
when they are examined as a package, a very different picture emerges.  All of the 
decisions were in favour of the defendant; all but one invoked amicus participation 
on the part of the Department of Justice in favour of the defendant’s position; and 
most were unanimous or nearly so.  Especially given the last point, it is hard to 
attribute this development to some kind of laissez-faire packing of the Court by 
Reagan, Bush I, and Bush II.  Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Ginsberg are clearly in 
the liberal (in the American sense) camp on almost all social issues.  Nor can it be 
attributed to the wool being pulled over those Justices’ eyes by more antitrust-
knowledgeable members of the Court.  Justice Breyer taught antitrust law at 
Harvard; Stevens was an experienced antitrust practitioner; Ginsberg had strong 
connections to the talented, left-leaning group of antitrust academics at Columbia 
such as Milton Handler and Robert Pitofsky. So what is going on? 
 I would suggest that what is happening is that the Court has finally realised that 
much of the traditional antitrust doctrine of the 20th century is badly out of step with 
basic industrial organisation economics, and has been for some time.  Moreover, the 
Court has been sensitised to the possibility that over-reaching antitrust doctrine has 
real consequences, not just for the unlucky corporations caught by one of the fly-by-
night plaintiffs’ class action lawsuits, but for other corporations who may feel the 
need to compete less aggressively as a result, and therefore for consumers as well.  
The frequent reference to Type I errors is significant and cannot be attributed to the 
esoteric leanings of a lowly law clerk who managed to sneak the phrase into a 
judgment when no one was paying attention.   
 Moreover, I think the flurry of decisions suggests that the Court may see itself 
as on some kind of mission to clean up antitrust, and there is certainly more cleaning 
up to do: bundled discounts; the unfortunate legacy of LePage’s,52  the extreme 
treatment of conduct characterised as a tying arrangement as compared to the more 
lenient treatment of essentially the same conduct when treated as exclusive dealing 
or simply as an act of monopolisation or attempted monopolisation; the difference 
between the way exclusive dealing is treated under §1 and under §2 as exemplified 
in the Microsoft opinion.53 I predict, therefore, that we have not seen the end of this 
                                                 
52  LePage’s Inc v 3M, 324 F 3d 141 (3rd Cir, 2003). 
53  United States v Microsoft, 253 F 3d 34 (DC Cir, 2001). 
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train and that subsequent decisions will be no less defendant-friendly.  There is of 
course an irony in this pattern of defendant-friendly results in that, over the last 
decade or so, economists have been working frenetically to develop more plaintiff-
friendly explanations for much of the same conduct that the Court has been blessing 
as pro-consumer, but this is the material for another essay altogether.54 
 
 
IV   IMPLICATIONS FOR AUSTRALIA 
 
 Why should anyone ‘down under’ care what has been happening in the U.S.? 
After all, Australia has its own statutes, not at all identical to the Sherman Act, and 
its own growing jurisprudence.  So what if U.S. courts have gone off in a particular 
direction?  But with all due respect to the independence of Australian courts, the 
economic analysis of markets and conduct is global, not country-specific, 
notwithstanding differences in industry structure across different jurisdictions that 
may affect the actual application of economic analysis.  To the extent the reform 
movement is driven by fundamental (even if somewhat simplistic) economic 
principles, it cannot be so easily dismissed as being ‘not our problem.’  Add to this 
the political support for global convergence on antitrust jurisprudence, and I think 
there is a force here that must be reckoned with.  Developments in antitrust 
jurisprudence in the U.S. will certainly be brought to the attention of courts in 
Australia by parties who would benefit from an adaptation of Australian law to these 
developments.  I am sceptical that courts here can or will want to adopt a ‘hear no 
evil’ approach. 
                                                 
54  Caution is urged in reading too much into this recent development in the literature.  
Inherent in the academic nature of most economists is the need to develop theories that 
challenge the prevailing wisdom.  Whether these new theories are either genuinely 
relevant to the analysis of real-world behaviour, given the complex assumptions that 
underlie many of the modern theorems, or whether, despite their occasional relevance 
and ‘correctness,’ these newer models are simply too complex to provide useful guidance 
for judges and lay juries remain unanswered questions. 
